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Abstract: This paper explores the relationship between the constitutional
entrenchment of central bank independence and inflation performance.
Empirical studies for developing countries have not found a relationship
between central bank independence, proxied by the de jure independence
established in the central bank law, and inflation. We argue that the Con-
stitution is likely to be better enforced than ordinary statutes owing to its
higher legal rank. Our empirical analysis finds that in a sample of Latin
American and Caribbean countries, those countries that entrench the
independence of the central bank in the Constitution have a better infla-
tion performance.
Keywords: central bank independence, inflation, Latin American coun-
tries.
Resumen: Ese artículo analiza la relación entre la introducción de dispo-
siciones constitucionales que dotan de independencia a los bancos cen-
trales, y la evolución de la inflación. La literatura empírica no encuentra
una relación entre la independencia del banco central, aproximada por la
independencia de jure conforme a la ley o estatutos del banco central, y la
inflación en los países en vías de desarrollo.  Este artículo argumenta que
en general la Constitución, debido a su status legal superior, suele
implementarse mejor que otras leyes o estatutos de menor rango legal.
Nuestro análisis empírico encuentra, para un muestra consistente en los
países latinoamericanos y caribeños, que aquellos países que sustentaron
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la independencia del banco central en disposiciones constitucionales tie-
nen menor inflación, controlando por otros factores.
Palabras clave: independencia del banco central, inflación, América
Latina.
Introduction
n the early 1980’s, a body of the monetary economics literature
postulated that an autonomous and accountable central bank faci-
litates price stability. The more the central bank is formally separa-
ted from the government’s short-term influence on monetary policy, the
more the inflation bias will be reduced, provided that the central bank
is held accountable for its monetary policy performance. Since then,
several countries have reformed their central bank legislations to en-
hance the autonomy and accountability of the central bank. In many
cases, international financial institutions (IFIs) provided technical
assistance in this area to developing and transition countries. Moreover,
central bank legislation reform was often a condition for the disburse-
ment of loans granted by these institutions. Some countries, in many
cases after they had experienced a period of high inflation, made an
additional effort to also entrench central bank independence in the
Constitution.
Several empirical studies have looked at the relationship between
inflation and the central bank legislation. The results indicate that in-
flation is negatively correlated with the degree of de jure autonomy of
the central bank in industrialized countries but not in developing coun-
tries. A possible explanation is that enforcement of the legislation is
weaker in developing countries. Therefore, in these countries, the de jure
autonomy of the central bank is a poor proxy for its de facto autonomy.
Some studies used the turnover rate of governors as an alternative meas-
ure of the de facto autonomy of the central bank. However, as discus-
sed in Section II, results were mixed.
This paper proposes an alternative proxy for the de facto autonomy
of the central bank, based exclusively in the degree of autonomy grant-
ed to the central bank by the Constitution. There are several reasons
why constitutional provisions regarding the central bank might reflect
the true degree of autonomy of the institution better than the central
bank charter. Even in countries with less than perfect legal enforce-
ment systems, the Constitution is likely to be better enforced than
ordinary statutes due to its higher legal rank. Claims on the violation
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of constitutional provisions can only be addressed by the Constitu-
tional Court, typically including the most respected judges in the coun-
try. The members of the court hold long-term positions, which help
detach them from government influence. In addition, constitutional
entrenchment might enhance central bank independence, particularly
in environments where the government or the governing coalition with
a legislative majority attempts to influence central bank policies. This
is so because modifications in the Constitution tend to require quali-
fied majorities, eliminating potential threats to make changes in the
legal status of the central bank. Furthermore, constitutional entrench-
ment of central bank independence reflects a wide political and social
consensus regarding the status and objectives of the central bank,
which is likely to be translated into de facto central bank indepen-
dence. Surprisingly, the relationship between inflation performance
and the constitutional provisions on central banking has yet to be
empirically studied.
This paper explores the relationship between the constitutional
entrenchment of central bank independence and inflation performance in
Latin American countries. Typically, the extent to which central bank
independence is reflected in the Constitution depends on several fac-
tors, such as the country’s economic system, legislative tradition, its
degree of economic development and its economic history. 1 Many Latin
American countries experienced hyperinflation and economic reces-
sion during the 1980’s partly owing to expansionary monetary policies
that accommodated fiscal expenditures. Constitutional reforms in the
late 1980’s and early 1990’s in several Latin American countries intro-
duced a chapter devoted to the central bank, with provisions explic-
itly establishing the autonomy of the central bank, and mechanisms
for the supervision of its functions. Moreover, provisions explicitly
prohibiting the central bank from providing direct credit to the gov-
ernment were also introduced. Both the richness of constitutional detail
regarding the central bank, and the fact that the constitutional re-
forms were introduced several years ago, make Latin American coun-
tries the most adequate sample to use in a study of the relationship
between inflation performance and entrenchment of central bank inde-
pendence and accountability in the Constitution.
1 For a detailed survey on constitutional provisions in central bank independence and ac-
countability, see Gutiérrez (2000), “Central Banking and Constitution: Cross Country Survey”,
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I provides an
overview of the literature on central bank independence and inflation
performance. Section II describes the index constructed to measure the
degree of central bank independence based on the constitutional pro-
visions on central banking. Section III explores the relationship be-
tween this index and inflation performance in Latin American and
Caribbean countries. Finally, section IV summarizes the conclusions.
I. Review of the Literature2
The theoretical literature has provided three complementary arguments
to explain why delegation of monetary policy to an independent cen-
tral bank would yield, ceteris paribus, lower inflation rates. The first two
arguments relate to the fiscal position of the government, whilst the
third argument deals with the time-inconsistency issues. However, it is
important to notice that central bank independence would matter to the
extent that the central bank authorities are primarily concerned with
price stability.
The first argument indicates that the government will be inclined
to exert political pressure on the monetary authorities to relax mon-
etary conditions. Restrictive monetary policy tends to worsen the fiscal
position of the government through a reduction in seigniorage revenue,
increase in the interest burden of the debt and lower tax receipts be-
cause of the temporary economic slowdown. Political independence
allows the central bank to resist government pressures to ease mon-
etary conditions.
The second argument points out that, when monetary authorities
are forced to finance government deficits by printing money, money
supply becomes endogenous. However, a central bank enjoying eco-
nomic independence will force the government to reduce the deficit.
Finally, the third argument in favor of central bank independence
notices that governments typically have short-term objectives which
are inconsistent with the longer horizon objectives. Governments, for
example, might attempt to temporarily stimulate the economy through
a monetary expansion, exploiting price rigidities, at the cost of future
higher inflation. Lack of credibility in the government commitment
to the announced inflation objective leads rational economic agents to
2 This section draws heavily in Eijffinger and De Haan (1996).economía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XIII, núm. 2, segundo semestre de 2004 259
demand a risk premium to compensate for this inflationary bias. Del-
egation of monetary policy to an independent central bank solves the
government time-inconsistency problem and eliminates the growth-
hampering risk premium. However, the theoretical literature has also
pointed out that an independent central bank should be accountable
and coordinate its policies with the government. The institution to which
the responsibility over monetary policy is delegated should be account-
able to democratically elected representatives and to the public in
general. Also, coordination of monetary and fiscal policy is important
to achieve higher output growth and lower inflation.3
The theoretical literature contains alternative views with respect
to the effect of central bank independence on the level of economic
growth. On the one hand, low levels of inflation result in temporarily
high real interest rates, with the subsequent negative effect on econo-
mic growth. On the other hand, low and stable inflation rates reduce
risk premium interest rates, thereby stimulating economic growth.
Traditionally, the empirical literature has focused on the relation-
ship between the de jure independence of the central bank and inflation
performance.4 Alesina (1988, 1989), Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini
(1991), Eijffinger and Schaling (1993, 1995), Cukierman (1992) and
Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) are among the first studying
this relationship. The authors constructed different indexes including
categories such as: i) the location of responsibility over monetary policy;
ii) whether members of the government sit on the governing body of
the central bank; iii) appointment and dismissal procedures for the mem-
bers of the governing body of the central bank, as well as the length of
their office term; iv) the importance of price stability in comparison to
other objectives; and v) constraints on the government’s ability to bor-
row from the central bank. The indexes elaborated by these authors
have been widely used in the empirical literature over different samples
of countries.5 Most of the studies estimate the correlation between the
average inflation rate and the index of central bank independence
and have been criticized for not including appropriate controls. How-
3 See Andersen and Scheider (1986).
4 However there are central banks whose independence is not entrenched in the law but in
practice, accountability of the central bank and market reaction to central bank actions result
in de facto independence.
5 The relevance of such indexes as a measure of the independence of the central bank has
been criticized by Mangano (1998). He pointed out that the existing indicator differs consider-
ably, and that even the common criteria considered in the different indexes are subject to inter-
pretation differences. However, Berger et al. (2000) points out that his conclusions are severely
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ever, a few studies include other variables such as a measure of politi-
cal independence (Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabelini, 1991), and indi-
cators of openness, exchange rate-fixity, and budget deficit (Al-Marhubi
and Willet, 1995), or openness, political instability, and debt to GDP
ratios (Campillo and Miron, 1997). Some of the studies have also been
questioned because of sensitivity of the results to the sample period
and inappropriate control of influential observations, which could bias
the results. For example, Jacome (2001) concludes that those Latin
American countries with higher de jure independence of the central
bank, as reflected in the central bank legislation, have not experi-
enced lower inflation than the rest of the countries in the region, once
the observations for high inflation countries are removed. In any case,
it is important to point that correlation does not imply causality. It is
unclear if de jure independent central banks are more successful at
fighting inflation, or if countries where the fight for inflation is con-
sidered a priority entrench the independence of the central bank in
the law.
With few exceptions,6 most of the studies focus on industrialized
countries. A review of the literature by Cukierman (1994) concludes
that higher de jure independence is related to lower inflation in in-
dustrialized countries but not in developing countries.7 A more recent
review of the latest empirical papers by Berger et al. (2000) also sup-
ports this view.
Central bank independence does not necessarily need to be entren-
ched in the law to ensure de facto independence. Accountability prac-
tices of the central bank and market reaction to central bank actions
may enforce discipline in the central bank and government actions.
However, measuring de facto independence is complicated. Several
studies have looked at the turnover rate of central bank governors as
a proxy for de facto independence of the central bank. The argument
is that a high turnover of governors is a symptom of low degree of de
facto political independence. Cukierman (1992) finds a negative cor-
relation between turnover rates and inflation in its sample of devel-
6 See Cukierman (1992), Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) and Campillo and Miron (1997).
7 This result is also found in Cukierman and Webb (1995), and De Haan and Siermann
(1996). Lybek (1999) finds a negative correlation between average inflation in 15 former Soviet
republics and an index of de jure independence that includes also categories regarding central
bank accountability and mechanisms for policy coordination with the government. However,
Malizewski (2000) and Cukierman et al. (2001) look at a sample of 26 transition economies and
find a negative correlation between an index of central bank independence and inflation perfor-
mance only for economies with a high degree of liberalization.economía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XIII, núm. 2, segundo semestre de 2004 261
oping countries, although the rest of the studies are less conclusive.
De Haan and Koi (2000), using a sample of 89 developing countries,
find that turnover rates are related to inflation only if the high infla-
tion countries are included in the sample. Lybek (1999) and Jacome
(2001) do not find a correlation between this variable and average
inflation in a sample of former soviet republics and Latin American
countries, respectively.
II. A Constitutional Index of Central Bank
Independence and Accountability
In order to measure the de jure independence and accountability of the
central bank based on the constitutional provisions, we ranked coun-
tries according to an index based on Lybek (1998, 1999). The index
considers five broad criteria: i) the objectives of the central bank;
ii) responsibilities of the central bank regarding monetary and exchange
policy; iii) the degree of political autonomy of the central bank; iv) the
degree of economic autonomy of the central bank; and v) accountabil-
ity procedures to which the central bank is subjected. The following
paragraphs describe the categories and how they affect independence
and accountability, while Table 1 details the subcategories within the
five broad criteria included in the index and the score given to each of
them.8
Central Bank Objectives
A clear definition and prioritization of the objectives of the central
bank enhances the credibility and effectiveness of monetary policy
and facilitates accountability. Price stability —as the best contribu-
tion to sustained economic growth— should be the primary objective
of the central bank. Other formulations, such as preserving the sta-
bility of the currency or preserving monetary stability, could pose a
conflict between the internal and the external value of the currency.
In addition, the central bank may support the economic policies of the
government and pursue other objectives. However, clear priority to
8 A review of best practices regarding central bank independence and accountability can
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the preservation of price stability should be given to avoid policy con-
flicts. In this regard, delegation of banking supervision to an autono-
mous institution might prevent other objectives, related to the main-
tenance of the stability of the financial system, from interfering with
the objective of price stability. 9
Central Bank Responsibilities in Monetary and Exchange Policy
An independent central bank has autonomy to implement monetary
and exchange rate policy in order to achieve its target. If the central
bank has target autonomy, it can decide on the monetary target for
achieving its primary objective. Under a regime of instrument auto-
nomy, the central bank implements monetary and exchange rate policy
according to a target determined by the cabinet or the legislative in
agreement with the central bank. Decisions on policies to implement
the target can be taken by the central bank without need to consult
with the government. Both target and instrument autonomy confers
great degree of independence to the central bank. Coordination with
the government in the formulation of monetary and exchange rate
policies help to avoid inconsistency in the targets and facilitates imple-
mentation by the central bank. Clear procedures to resolve conflicts
between the government and the central bank thus enhance the inde-
pendence of the bank. These procedures ensure that the government
cannot overrule the central bank, or that the bank is not obliged to
accept orders from the government, except during extraordinary cir-
cumstances, which should be promptly communicated to the general
public. At the minimum, the procedures should allow the central bank
to make public when it is forced to adopt decisions contrary to its
opinion, so the public knows that the responsibility of the policies
adopted at that point lies with the government.
Political Autonomy of the Central Bank
Political autonomy of the members of the governing bodies of the cen-
tral bank is important to prevent undue short-term influence on mon-
9 However, an autonomous central bank may be in some countries better suited to conduct
banking supervision than a newer government agency.economía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XIII, núm. 2, segundo semestre de 2004 269
etary policy by the government or other constituencies. The composi-
tion of the central bank governing bodies and the procedures for ap-
pointment and dismissal of its members —as well as their term in
office— determine the degree of political independence of the central
bank. For example, the presence of government representatives with
voting rights on the central bank board diminishes the political inde-
pendence of the bank. Participation of both the executive and the leg-
islative branches in the nomination and appointment of the governor
and directors of the central bank reduces the scope for unduly politi-
cally nominated appointments. Dismissal of the governor and the board
members should occur only for incapacity to perform their duties, which
should be specified, and gross misconduct. The latter could be ruled
upon by an independent tribunal and/or require approval by the legis-
lature with a qualified majority. The term of office of the governor and
directors should preferably be longer than the executive and legisla-
tive terms, in order to separate their term of service from that of the
nominating or appointing authorities. However, for accountability pur-
poses, it may prove useful to have external members represented on
the board overseeing the bank.
Economic Autonomy of the Central Bank
The economic autonomy of the central bank refers to the capacity of
the central bank to: i) control its own balance sheet; and ii) to affect
liquidity levels and interest rates in order to implement its targets.
Compulsory monetization of the deficit or injection of liquidity via
operations with the private sector could compromise the achievement
of the monetary policy targets. Prohibiting, or at least limiting, credit
to government and non-financial institutions helps to ensure the eco-
nomic autonomy of the central bank. Also, low profitability might in-
duce the central bank to avoid tight monetary policy or to use direct
instruments of monetary policy that may function as implicit taxes.
Requiring executive or legislative approval of the central bank budget
might subject the central bank to indirect political influence. Finally,
the solvency of the central bank should be ensured to make the central
bank economically independent of the government.270 Gutiérrez: Inflation Performance and Constitutional Central Bank Independence
Accountability Procedures for the Central Bank
Accountability procedures facilitate the control of central bank activi-
ties, policies and operations. Such control provides adequate incen-
tives for the central bank to implement the policies to achieve the
monetary policy targets. Transparency and accountability also pro-
tect the central bank from government intervention in the implemen-
tation of policies. To this end, it is important that the central bank
regularly reports to the legislative branch or to the public on the ex-
ecution of its policies, and that the central bank regularly publishes
its audited financial statements.
The assigned value in the index used in this survey for the five
broad categories described above is presented in Table 1. All the former
British and Dutch colonies do not include provisions dealing with the
autonomy of the central bank in the Constitution; hence, those coun-
tries have a value of zero in the index. In some cases, the constitu-
tional provisions explicitly undermine the autonomy of the central
bank. In these cases, the value of the index for the different criteria is
negative. For example, in the case of Bolivia and El Salvador, the Con-
stitution establishes objectives other than price stability as the pri-
mary objectives of the central bank. In the case of Guatemala, the
Constitution establishes that three members of the cabinet will also
be members of the central bank board.10
Based on the index described below, we measured the de jure inde-
pendence of central banks as established in the constitutions, in all
Central and Latin American countries, as well as in most of the Carib-
bean countries. Table 2 summarizes the score in each of the five cat-
egories for all the countries in the sample. Details on how the coun-
tries rank in the different subcategories can be found in the appendix
table.
The Constitution does not contain references to the central bank
in 40% of the countries in the sample. Paraguay and Mexico are the
countries with strongest independence as measured by the index. In
the case of Paraguay, the high value is due to high scores in all catego-
ries compared to the average values, while in the case of Mexico is
mostly due to the high score in the political autonomy category. On
the other hand, the total value of the index for Colombia is negative,
due to the scores in the political and economic autonomy categories.
10 The details on the components of the index are presented in the Appendix.economía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XIII, núm. 2, segundo semestre de 2004 271
Average scores are similar in all categories with the exception of policy
formulation, for which is higher. The sample dispersion is particu-
larly important in the political autonomy category. While in some coun-
tries the Constitution specifies the governor and board members have
to be nominated or appointed by Congress, can not be dismissed ex-
cept for clear reasons, and can not be members of the government, in
other cases, the Constitution indicates which government members
have a seat at the central bank board.
Table 2. Country Classification According to Index
Policy For- Political Economic Accounta-
Objectives mulation Autonomy Autonomy bility
Argentina 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bahamas 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Barbados 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Belize 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bolivia –0.25 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Brazil 0.00 0.00 3.00 1.00 0.00
Chile 0.00 0.25 0.00 2.25 0.00
Colombia 1.00 1.50 –2.50 –1.50 1.00
Costa Rica 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.75
Dominican
Republic 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ecuador 1.25 1.25 0.00 0.00 0.00
El Salvador –1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Guatemala 0.50 2.50 –4.00 2.25 0.00
Guyana 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Haiti 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.25 0.75
Honduras 0.25 2.75 0.00 0.00 0.75
Jamaica 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mexico 1.00 0.75 5.00 0.00 0.00
Nicaragua 0.75 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.75
Panama 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Paraguay 0.75 1.25 3.00 1.25 1.00
Peru 1.75 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Suriname 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Uruguay 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Venezuela 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average 0.24 0.53 0.28 0.29 0.32272 Gutiérrez: Inflation Performance and Constitutional Central Bank Independence
III. Constitutional Central Bank Independence
and Inflation Performance in Latin America
During the 1980’s, particularly the second half of the decade and the
early 1990’s, many Latin American countries experienced high infla-
tion. Large fiscal deficits financed through monetization were in most
cases at the root of the problem. With the goal of eliminating infla-
tionary pressures, several countries reformed their constitutions to
include provisions explicitly forbidding central bank credit to govern-
ment (for example, in the case of Brazil, Chile and Guatemala). Some
countries also entrenched the political independence of the central
bank in the Constitution. Most of the countries did so by amending
their Constitution in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, coinciding with
the inflationary periods. The exception was Chile, which introduced
such constitutional provisions in 1980.11 Constitutional provisions were
introduced in many cases ahead of changes in the central bank law
(e.g., Brazil, Chile and Paraguay), or simultaneously (Mexico and Peru).
Other countries, like Argentina and El Salvador, opted for a fixed ex-
change rate regime as part of a disinflationary program. Subsequently,
average inflation decreased considerably in the continent during the
second half of the 1990’s (see Table 3).
To test whether the entrenchment of central bank independence in
the Constitution results in lower inflation, we estimated the correlation
(controlling for other factors) between the index discussed in the pre-
vious section and a measure of inflation during the period 1995-99.
Following Cukierman (1992), we transformed the inflation variable to
reduce heteroskedasticity of the error and thus improve the efficiency
of the estimation. Using the conventional notation of p for the infla-
tion rate, our measure p/(1 + p) indicates the annual real depreciation
of a given amount of money.
A first task is to assign weights to the different components of the
index. Instead of assigning arbitrary weights, as typically done in
the literature, we took the approach of letting the data reveal what
are the components driving the correlation between inflation and our
index of constitutional central bank independence. To do so, we esti-
mated the following non-linear equation:
11 A new Constitution was promulgated in Venezuela in 1999, including a section on provi-
sions dealing with the independence and accountability of the central bank.economía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XIII, núm. 2, segundo semestre de 2004 273
yi = xi9b + a*S5
j = 1gj*zij + ui
where yi denotes our measure of inflation for country i, x is a vector of
control variables, zij is the component j of the index for country i, and
ui is an error term.
As discussed in the previous section, we consider five components
in the index —the objectives of the central bank, the authority over
Table 3. Dates of Latin American and Caribbean Constitutions and
Inflation Performance
Amendments Average Inflation
to Constitution 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99
Argentina 1994 268.11 863.27 505.07 0.76
Bahamas 1973 7.44 5.12 4.33 1.32
Barbados 1966 9.85 3.92 3.32 2.45
Belize 1981 6.61 2.46 2.35 1.65
Bolivia 1994 351.97 2 414.35 13.41 7.43
Brazil 1988 132.35 532.26 1 667.21 19.35
Chile 1980 22.38 20.34 17.48 6.04
Colombia 1991 22.89 24.03 26.60 18.33
Costa Rica 1949 37.98 16.21 18.57 15.13
Dominican
Republic 1994 11.54 30.21 23.06 7.44
Ecuador 1996 25.07 42.88 44.82 33.25
El Salvador 1982 13.74 23.30 15.74 5.47
Guatemala 1993 6.10 18.03 21.42 8.11
Guyana 1996 n.a. n.a n.a 7.00
Haiti 1987 10.53 2.70 25.02 17.61
Honduras 1982 9.89 4.91 19.71 19.77
Jamaica 1962 17.20 14.01 41.49 14.11
Mexico 1994 56.10 82.00 16.31 24.50
Nicaragua 1995 30.10 3 357.61 2 096.27 11.21
Panama 1983 5.81 0.49 1.11 1.08
Paraguay 1992 15.38 25.56 23.27 9.70
Peru 1993 84.08 878.57 1,607.41 8.39
Suriname 1992 7.66 18.21 120.67 71.98
Uruguay 1997 44.20 70.96 76.36 21.38
Venezuela 1983 13.03 33.00 41.05 53.84
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; and Constitution Finder.274 Gutiérrez: Inflation Performance and Constitutional Central Bank Independence
monetary and exchange rate policy, the political autonomy of the cen-
tral bank, its economic autonomy and its accountability. We normal-
ized the coefficient for the economic independence, g3 , equal to one. In
the vector of controls x, we include a constant term as well as vari-
ables that can potentially affect the inflation such as the public deficit
as a percentage of GDP, the degree of openness of the economy, a dummy
indicating whether the exchange rate is fixed, and a dummy indicat-
ing whether the country experienced a banking crisis during any of
the years in the period.12 All variables —except for the dummies—
are averages over the period 1995–99. Table 4 reports the results of
the estimation.
The results of the estimation indicate that, controlling for other
factors, countries that entrench the independence of the central bank in
the Constitution tend to have lower inflation than countries that do not.
The results indicate that the coefficient on the index, a, is negative, and
statistically significant. The components of the index that drive the re-
sult are the degree of economic independence of the central bank (whose
coefficient was normalized to one) and the objectives of the central bank.
That is, countries whose Constitution states that the primary objec-
tive of the central bank is price stability, and that forbid or limit central
bank credit to the government and the private sector, tend to have lower
inflation. The results also indicate that having a fixed exchange rate re-
gime reduces inflation while the occurrence of banking crisis increases
inflation, other things equal. The level of public deficit and the degree of
openness of the economy turned out not to be significant. Regarding the
public deficit, it might be due to the fact that we are controlling for
the capacity of the central bank to resist public deficit monetization. If
deficits are to be financed in an orthodox way, the impact on inflation
is lower. Most surprising is the lack of significance of the openness
variable, measured as non-oil imports and exports over GDP. Non-oil
imports over GDP were also used as an alternative proxy for the com-
petitiveness to correct for the fact that many countries are large com-
modity exporters. However, results did not change.
Using the weights for the statistically significant components of the
index estimated in the non-linear regression above, we constructed
12 Following Leone, Jacome and Madrid (2001), the countries identified as suffering a bank-
ing crisis during any of the years of the period were Argentina, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and
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the index and run a linear regression of the measure of inflation on the
index and the dummy variables. The results are reported in Table 5.13
Recent empirical work by Jacome (2001) finds no evidence that
Latin American countries with independent and accountable central
banks as reflected in the central bank legislation, have lower infla-
tion. With a smaller sample of countries and a different period (1999-
2001), he analyzes, using scatter plot graphs, the correlation between
his index and the average rate of inflation. While he found a negative
13 Openness and public deficit variables, as well as cross terms between these variables
and the index of independence, were included in the regression; however, they turned out not to
be significant. We also ran the regression using inflation averages for 1996–99 and 1997–99
to test the robustness of the results. The results did not change.
Table 4. Estimation of Weights for Constitution-Based Index
of Central Bank Independence
Dependent Variable





Exchange rate dummy –0.131* –0.139* –0.144*
[–4.000] [–4.540] [–5.360]
Banking crisis dummy 0.112* 0.094* 0.089*
[2.660] [2.290] [2.460]
a –0.027* –0.033* –0.030*
[–2.870] [–3.660] [3.460]
g1: Central bank objectives 1.858* 1.386* 1.275**
[1.990] [2.010] [1.700]
g2: Policy formulation –0.971 –0.585
[–1.500] [–1.460]
g4: Political autonomy –0.044 –0.007
[–0.284] [–.060]
g5: Accountability 0.069 0.385
[0.091] [0.660]
Adjusted R2 0.391 0.437 0.493
Note: t-statistics shown in brackets. Values with one and two asterisks at right are significant
at, respectively, the 5% and 10% levels.276 Gutiérrez: Inflation Performance and Constitutional Central Bank Independence
correlation between his index and inflation, the correlation was due
to the presence of two outliers in the sample.14 The correlation disap-
peared when these two countries were removed. Using his same
sample, we plotted our index of independence based on constitutional
provisions against the average inflation for the period. We also found
a negative correlation between our index and average inflation. More-
over, the correlation persisted after removing the two outliers (Argen-
tina and Venezuela), that determined the correlation with the Legis-
lation Based Index of Central Bank Independence (see Figure 1).
However, formal testing of whether entrenching the independence
of the central bank in the Constitution results in lower inflation perfor-
mance controlling for the fact that independence is entrenched on the
central bank act remains to be done. To perform such a test, we fol-
lowed the methodology of Jacome (2001) to construct his index of in-
dependence based on central bank legislation for the countries in our
sample not included in his work, i.e., Bahamas, Barbados, El Salva-
dor, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica and Nicaragua. Unfortunately, legisla-
tion for Belize, Ecuador and Suriname was not available. The latest
law to be enacted was the Nicaraguan Central Bank Act in 1999, also
the year in which the new Constitution of Venezuela (not considered
in the constitutional index) was approved. Since Venezuela as a high
inflation country has proved heavily influencing the result of the re-
gressions, we chose to include Nicaragua and drop Venezuela in our
sample to analyze the period 1999–2001. The values for the two in-
dexes are show in Table 6.
Table 5. Estimation of Correlation Between Inflation
and Constitution-Based Index of Central Bank Independence
Dependent Variable Estimated
p/(1 + p) Coefficients T-statistics*
Exchange rate dummy –0.144 –4.98
Banking crisis dummy 0.089 2.20
Constitutional based
central bank independence index –0.030 –2.33
Adjusted R2 0.520
* T-statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity.
14 Namely, Argentina and Venezuela. Argentina is the only country in the sample with a
fixed exchange rate for the period. Venezuela is the only country in the sample that experienced
a banking crisis during the period. In estimating the correlation plotting in the graphs, no
additional variables are included to control for those factors.economía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XIII, núm. 2, segundo semestre de 2004 277
Figure 1. Comparison of Performance of Constitution-Based
and Legislation-Based Indices of Central Bank Independence
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Although the correlation between the two indexes is positive as
expected, it is rather low at 0.18, reflecting the different ranking of
countries depending on the indexes. For example, Guatemala has one
of the lowest degrees of independence according to the law-based in-
dex, but ranks high on the constitution-based index. In this case, cen-
tral bank law provisions regarding political autonomy of the central
bank explain the low ranking in the central bank law based index.
However, the constitution-based index only considers the objectives
and economic independence of the central bank. The objective of pre-
serving monetary stability and the prohibition to finance government
deficits entrenched in the Guatemalan Constitution explain the high
independence value on the constitution-based index. Table 7 presents
the results of considering both indexes simultaneously. During the









Costa Rica 12.5 0.00
Dominican Republic 7.0 0.00
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period 1999–2001, none of the countries in the sample experienced a
banking crisis; therefore, that dummy variable is dropped from the
regression.
The results indicate that, although the coefficient is lower than
previously estimated, the Constitution-based index variable remains
significant at the 10% level in a time period and country sample dif-
ferent from the previously considered. The legislation based index re-
duces the t-statistic slightly, enough to show that the index is no longer
significant at the 10% level. However, the adjusted R-squared and the
t-statistic for the legislation based index do not support the inclusion
of the legislation based index in the specification. The legislation in-
dex alone does not result significant.
IV. Conclusions
Economic theory suggests that the more independent the central bank
is from political pressures, the lower the inflation in the economy, ceteris
paribus. The proposition has been widely accepted by mainstream
academics, policymakers and even markets. Empirical evidence from
industrialized countries confirms that countries with a de jure inde-
pendent central bank tend to have better inflation performance.
However, there is not much support for the theory when studying
the relationship between de jure central bank independence and in-
Table 7. Estimation of Correlation between Different Indices of
Independence and Inflation Performance
Dependent Variable
p/(1 + p) Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3
Exchange rate dummy –0.115* –0.068* –0.068*
[–1.936] [–5.010] [–5.090]
Constitution-based index –0.008 –0.009**
[–1.530] [–1.670]
Legislation-based index 0.003 –0.001
[0.774] [–0.678]
Adjusted R2 0.279 0.536 0.550
Note: T-statistics shown in brackets. Values with one and two asterisks at right are
significant at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively.280 Gutiérrez: Inflation Performance and Constitutional Central Bank Independence
flation performance in developing countries. A possible explanation is
that laws are less likely to be enforced or that political pressure may
be exerted under the threat of modifying the legislation.15
Appendix
This paper explores the relationship between inflation performance
and the level of independence of the central bank entrenched in the
Constitution. Typically, constitutions are better enforced than ordi-
nary laws given their superior legal rank. In addition, modifications
typically required qualified majorities to make the Constitution much
harder to amend than a law.
The results indicate that Latin American countries that entrench
the independence of the central bank in the Constitution tend to have
lower inflation, controlling for other factors. Particularly relevant is
the inclusion of constitutional provisions forbidding or limiting cen-
tral bank financing to the state and the private sector, and provisions
establishing price stability as the primary objective of the central bank.
The correlation, however, does not imply causality. Entrenching the
independence of the central bank in the Constitution requires a higher
degree of political consensus, and that consensus on fighting infla-
tion, rather than the higher degree of enforcement of the Constitu-
tion, could explain the result. In any case, the degree of consensus can
change over time. Entrenching the independence of the central bank
in the Constitution has the effect of “tying the hands” of the legisla-
ture and the executive, who will require broader political support to
modify the Constitution. The results have policy implications, par-
ticularly for countries with weak institutions and legal frameworks
or with changing political objectives and a fragile political consensus.
The results indicates that Argentinean legislators could consider en-
hancing the credibility of the central bank by entrenching its inde-
pendence in the Constitution.
15 For example, the “superpowers” granted by the Argentinean Congress to the Minister of
Economics in 2001 allowed him to modify the Central Bank Charter by decree. The result was
a relaxation of the currency board agreement, by removing the limit on the flow of reserves that
could be invested in domestic treasury bills. Currently, the Polish parliament is studying an
amendment to the central bank law to include economic growth as one of the objectives of the
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